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From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
To: Bruno Haible <bruno@clisp.org>
Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>, bug-gnulib@gnu.org
Subject: Re: Coverity false positives triggered by gnulib's implementation of base64
Date: Fri, 10 May 2019 16:32:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2074537.q5eH3G9g4i@kdudka-nb> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2726075.gEfPVFXcrz@omega>

On Friday, May 10, 2019 4:11:45 PM CEST Bruno Haible wrote:
> Kamil Dudka wrote:
> > Thanks!  This also helps to suppress the false positives on cryptsetup
> > with Coverity Static Analysis version 2019.03.
> 
> Good! Since this is the approach that Paul prefers, I'm pushing this one:
> 
> 
> 2019-05-10  Bruno Haible  <bruno@clisp.org>
> 
> 	base64: Avoid false positive warning from Coverity.
> 	Reported by Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>.
> 	Idea by Paul Eggert.
> 	* lib/base64.c (base64_encode_fast, base64_encode): Add a no-op
> 	'& 0x3f' to the array index expressions. This convinces Coverity that
> 	there is no out-of-bounds array reference, regardless of the input.
> 
> diff --git a/lib/base64.c b/lib/base64.c
> index f3f7298..a00e0f4 100644
> --- a/lib/base64.c
> +++ b/lib/base64.c
> @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ base64_encode_fast (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
> char *restrict out) {
>    while (inlen)
>      {
> -      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
> +      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
>        *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4) + (to_uchar (in[1]) >> 4)) &
> 0x3f]; *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[1]) << 2) + (to_uchar (in[2]) >> 6)) &
> 0x3f]; *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[2]) & 0x3f];
> @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ base64_encode (const char *restrict in, size_t inlen,
> 
>    while (inlen && outlen)
>      {
> -      *out++ = b64c[to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2];
> +      *out++ = b64c[(to_uchar (in[0]) >> 2) & 0x3f];
>        if (!--outlen)
>          break;
>        *out++ = b64c[((to_uchar (in[0]) << 4)

Works for me.  Thanks to both of you!

Kamil




  reply	other threads:[~2019-05-10 14:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-07 14:22 Coverity false positives triggered by gnulib's implementation of base64 Kamil Dudka
2019-05-08  8:15 ` Bruno Haible
2019-05-09 16:14   ` Kamil Dudka
2019-05-09 20:35     ` Bruno Haible
2019-05-09 21:55       ` Paul Eggert
2019-05-09 22:13         ` Bruno Haible
2019-05-09 22:28           ` Paul Eggert
2019-05-10 11:57           ` Kamil Dudka
2019-05-10 14:11             ` Bruno Haible
2019-05-10 14:32               ` Kamil Dudka [this message]
2019-05-10 11:41       ` Kamil Dudka
2019-05-09 19:14 ` Paul Eggert
2019-05-10 11:32   ` Kamil Dudka
2019-05-10 11:34     ` Florian Weimer
2019-05-10 11:51       ` Kamil Dudka
2019-05-10 23:36     ` Paul Eggert

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