From: Bruno Haible <bruno@clisp.org>
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>, bug-gnulib@gnu.org
Subject: Re: [PROPOSED 0/4] memset_explicit patches
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:04:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <12846274.EVyyLHbfrO@nimes> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87edtn2xn8.fsf@latte>
Simon Josefsson wrote:
> A general observation is that I'm mixed about offering replacement of
> security-relevant APIs which do not offer the same guarantees as a
> secure implementation. In these situations, it may actually be
> preferrably to crash or to refuse to build the application, at least by
> default.
I disagree. IMO, security is always done on a best-effort basis. There is
no 100% security.
In the case of memset_explicit, the secret may be present in memory
- with a working memset_explicit: for 5 microseconds,
- with a dysfunctional memset_explicit: for 5 seconds.
So, a working memset_explicit provides a 99.9999% protection, at most.
Even with a working memset_explicit, the attacker can halt the CPU at a
particular instruction before the erase (e.g. set a breakpoint at
memset_explicit :-) ), make a dump of the RAM of the process, and analyze it.
Therefore I don't think that an FTBFS or an abort() are justified if the
security guarantees cannot be met.
Bruno
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-28 16:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-28 4:55 [PROPOSED 0/4] memset_explicit patches Paul Eggert
2022-11-28 4:55 ` [PROPOSED 1/4] memset_explicit: new module Paul Eggert
2022-11-28 16:17 ` Bruno Haible
2022-11-28 4:55 ` [PROPOSED 2/4] read-file: use memset_explicit Paul Eggert
2022-11-28 4:55 ` [PROPOSED 3/4] explicit_bzero: memset_explicit is standard Paul Eggert
2022-11-28 4:55 ` [PROPOSED 4/4] explicit_bzero: implement via memset_explicit Paul Eggert
2022-11-28 16:17 ` Bruno Haible
2022-11-29 6:06 ` Paul Eggert
2022-11-29 8:09 ` Bruno Haible
2022-11-28 10:15 ` [PROPOSED 0/4] memset_explicit patches Simon Josefsson via Gnulib discussion list
2022-11-28 16:04 ` Bruno Haible [this message]
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