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From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>, git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] PREVIEW: Introduce DC_AND_OPENSSL_SHA1 make flag
Date: Sun, 26 Mar 2017 02:18:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170326061826.yx6nh3k2ps6uyyz6@sigill.intra.peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <xmqq7f3d6ev1.fsf@gitster.mtv.corp.google.com>

On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 11:37:54PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:

> The hash that names a packfile is constructed by sorting all the
> names of the objects contained in the packfile and running SHA-1
> hash over it.  I think this MUST be hashed with collision-attack
> detection.  A malicious site can feed you a packfile that contains
> objects the site crafts so that the sorted object names would result
> in a collision-attack, ending up with one pack that contains a sets
> of objects different from another pack that happens to have the same
> packname, causing Git to say "Ah, this new pack must have the same
> set of objects as the pack we already have" and discard it,
> resulting in lost objects and a corrupt repository with missing
> objects.

I don't think this case really matters for collision detection. What's
important is what Git does when it receives a brand-new packfile that
would overwrite an existing one. It _should_ keep the old one, under the
usual "existing data wins" rule.

It should be easy to test, though:

  $ git init tmp && cd tmp
  $ git commit --allow-empty -m foo
  $ git gc

  $ touch -d yesterday .git/objects/pack/*
  $ ls -l .git/objects/pack
  -r--r--r-- 1 peff peff 1128 Mar 25 02:10 pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.idx
  -r--r--r-- 1 peff peff  153 Mar 25 02:10 pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.pack

  $ git index-pack --stdin <.git/objects/pack/*.pack
  pack	7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b

  $ ls -l .git/objects/pack
  -r--r--r-- 1 peff peff 1128 Mar 25 02:10 pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.idx
  -r--r--r-- 1 peff peff  153 Mar 25 02:10 pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.pack

Looks like the timestamps were retained. <phew> And if we use strace, we
can see what happens:

  $ strace git index-pac k--stdin <.git/objects/pack/*.pack
  link(".git/objects/pack/tmp_pack_YSrdWU", ".git/objects/pack/pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.pack") = -1 EEXIST (File exists)
  unlink(".git/objects/pack/tmp_pack_YSrdWU") = 0
  link(".git/objects/pack/tmp_idx_O94NNU", ".git/objects/pack/pack-7e9d64ac27adc9ce1b12774dd287ff9bd8a9345b.idx") = -1 EEXIST (File exists)
  unlink(".git/objects/pack/tmp_idx_O94NNU") = 0

This is due to the link()/EEXIST handling in finalize_object_file. It
has a FIXME for a collision check, so we could actually detect at that
point whether we have a real collision, or if the other side just
happened to send us the same pack.

I wouldn't be surprised if the dumb-http walker is not so careful,
though (but the solution is to make it careful, not to worry about
a weak hash algorithm).

The rest of your email all made sense to me.

-Peff

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-03-26  6:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-24 23:24 [PATCH 0/7] PREVIEW: Introduce DC_AND_OPENSSL_SHA1 make flag Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:24 ` [PATCH 1/7] sha1dc: safeguard against outside definitions of BIGENDIAN Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:24 ` [PATCH 2/7] Makefile: optionally compile with both SHA1DC and SHA1_OPENSSL Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-25 19:51   ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2017-03-30 16:16   ` Junio C Hamano
2017-03-30 16:47     ` Junio C Hamano
2017-04-18 11:28     ` Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:24 ` [PATCH 3/7] config: add the core.enablesha1dc setting Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:25 ` [PATCH 4/7] t0013: do not skip the entire file wholesale without DC_SHA1 Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:25 ` [PATCH 5/7] t0013: test DC_AND_OPENSSL_SHA1, too Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:28 ` [PATCH 6/7] mingw: enable DC_AND_OPENSSL_SHA1 by default Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-24 23:28 ` [PATCH 7/7] p0013: new test to compare SHA1DC vs OpenSSL Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-25  6:37 ` [PATCH 0/7] PREVIEW: Introduce DC_AND_OPENSSL_SHA1 make flag Junio C Hamano
2017-03-25 16:58   ` Junio C Hamano
2017-03-26  6:18   ` Jeff King [this message]
2017-03-26 23:16     ` Junio C Hamano
2017-03-27  1:11       ` Jeff King
2017-03-27  6:07         ` Junio C Hamano
2017-03-27  7:09           ` Jeff King
2017-03-27 17:15             ` Junio C Hamano
2017-03-29 20:02   ` Johannes Schindelin
2017-03-30  0:31     ` Junio C Hamano
2017-04-18 11:30       ` Johannes Schindelin

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