From: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To: git@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
git-packagers@googlegroups.com
Subject: [ANNOUNCE] Git v2.17.1, v2.13.7, v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4
Date: Wed, 30 May 2018 02:01:17 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <xmqqy3g2flb6.fsf@gitster-ct.c.googlers.com> (raw)
The latest maintenance release Git v2.17.1 and updates to older
maintenance tracks are now available at the usual places.
The tarballs are found at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/
The following public repositories all have a copy of the 'v2.17.1'
tag and the 'maint' branch that the tag points at, as well as the
v2.13.7, v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4 tags:
url = https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/git/git
url = git://repo.or.cz/alt-git.git
url = https://github.com/gitster/git
----------------------------------------------------------------
Git v2.17.1 Release Notes
=========================
Fixes since v2.17
-----------------
* This release contains the same fixes made in the v2.13.7 version of
Git, covering CVE-2018-11233 and 11235, and forward-ported to
v2.14.4, v2.15.2 and v2.16.4 releases. See release notes to
v2.13.7 for details.
* In addition to the above fixes, this release adds support on the
server side that reject pushes to repositories that attempt to
create such problematic .gitmodules file etc. as tracked
contents, to help hosting sites protect their customers with
older clients by preventing malicious contents from spreading.
This is enabled by the same receive.fsckObjects configuration on
the server side as other security and sanity related checks
(e.g. rejecting tree entry ".GIT" in a wrong case as tracked
contents, targetting victims on case insensitive systems) that
have already been implemented in the past releases. It is
recommended to double check your configuration if you are hosting
contents for other people.
Git v2.13.7 Release Notes
=========================
Fixes since v2.13.6
-------------------
* Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we
blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo
paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the
name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause
Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235).
Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from
which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans.
* It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS
into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233).
Credit for fixing for these bugs goes to Jeff King, Johannes
Schindelin and others.
----------------------------------------------------------------
reply other threads:[~2018-05-29 17:01 UTC|newest]
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