git@vger.kernel.org list mirror (unofficial, one of many)
 help / color / Atom feed
From: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
To: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Cc: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason  <avarab@gmail.com>,
	Martin Langhoff <martin.langhoff@gmail.com>,
	Git Mailing List <git@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Git ransom campaign incident report - May 2019
Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 21:39:55 +0200 (DST)
Message-ID: <nycvar.QRO.7.76.6.1905172121130.46@tvgsbejvaqbjf.bet> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190516042739.GH4596@sigill.intra.peff.net>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2258 bytes --]

Hi,

On Thu, 16 May 2019, Jeff King wrote:

> On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 08:59:47PM +0200, Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason wrote:
>
> >
> > On Wed, May 15 2019, Martin Langhoff wrote:
> >
> > > Spotted this on the internet...
> > >
> > > https://github.blog/2019-05-14-git-ransom-campaign-incident-report/
> > >
> > > Haven't hacked on git for a while, and I am not affiliated with any of
> > > the stakeholders. However, reading it, I wanted to slam my head on the
> > > desk.
> > >
> > > IIRC, git will sanely store a password elsewhere if it gets to prompt
> > > for it. Should we be trying to unpack usernames/passwords from HTTP
> > > urls, and DTRT with them?
> > >
> > > Are there other ways this could be made better?
> >
> > I think we should do nothing.
>
> I think so, too.
>
> But just brainstorming, one thing we _could_ do is issue a warning when
> we see a password in a URL and say "hey, what you're doing isn't
> fantastic; considering using a credential helper".
>
> Of course I suspect there are many cases where people _do_ need to store
> the password in plaintext, because an automated system needs to fetch
> with it. They can use the plaintext git-credential-store, but it's
> slightly more hassle. And it doesn't really _solve_ the problem (though
> perhaps it would be harder to accidentally expose it with your web
> server!).

One thing that we actually *could* do here is to anonymize the URLs stored
under remote.origin.url when cloning. In no other circumstance that I can
think of do we take an URL from some command-line parameter that is not
*explicitly* intended for storing in the config.

Combined with that warning "You cloned via a URL that contains
credentials; for security reasons, the credentials were scrubbed before
storing this in your Git config. Please consider using a credential
manager instead of storing secrets in your Git config." this should
provide a reasonable compromise.

Judging from looking at my own automated jobs, it does not appear that you
would *ever* need to store such credentials in the Git config, anyway. If
you need to, say, push to a repository, you can always store the full URL
(or the credentials) in a secret variable.

Ciao,
Dscho

  reply index

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-15 17:49 Martin Langhoff
2019-05-15 18:59 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2019-05-16  4:27   ` Jeff King
2019-05-17 19:39     ` Johannes Schindelin [this message]
2019-05-17 22:20       ` Jeff King
2019-05-17 23:13         ` Martin Langhoff
2019-05-19  5:07         ` Jeff King
2019-05-19  5:10           ` [PATCH 1/3] transport_anonymize_url(): support retaining username Jeff King
2019-05-19 23:28             ` Eric Sunshine
2019-05-20 16:14             ` René Scharfe
2019-05-20 16:36             ` Johannes Schindelin
2019-05-20 16:43             ` Johannes Schindelin
2019-05-19  5:12           ` [PATCH 2/3] clone: avoid storing URL passwords in config Jeff King
2019-05-19  5:16           ` [PATCH 3/3] clone: auto-enable git-credential-store when necessary Jeff King
2019-05-20 11:28             ` Eric Sunshine
2019-05-20 12:31               ` Jeff King
2019-05-20 16:48                 ` Johannes Schindelin
2019-05-20 13:56             ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2019-05-20 14:08               ` Jeff King
2019-05-20 15:17                 ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2019-05-20 15:24                   ` Jeff King
2019-05-20 17:08             ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2019-05-20 14:43           ` Git ransom campaign incident report - May 2019 Johannes Schindelin

Reply instructions:

You may reply publically to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

  List information: http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=nycvar.QRO.7.76.6.1905172121130.46@tvgsbejvaqbjf.bet \
    --to=johannes.schindelin@gmx.de \
    --cc=avarab@gmail.com \
    --cc=git@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=martin.langhoff@gmail.com \
    --cc=peff@peff.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link

git@vger.kernel.org list mirror (unofficial, one of many)

Archives are clonable:
	git clone --mirror https://public-inbox.org/git
	git clone --mirror http://ou63pmih66umazou.onion/git
	git clone --mirror http://czquwvybam4bgbro.onion/git
	git clone --mirror http://hjrcffqmbrq6wope.onion/git

Newsgroups are available over NNTP:
	nntp://news.public-inbox.org/inbox.comp.version-control.git
	nntp://ou63pmih66umazou.onion/inbox.comp.version-control.git
	nntp://czquwvybam4bgbro.onion/inbox.comp.version-control.git
	nntp://hjrcffqmbrq6wope.onion/inbox.comp.version-control.git
	nntp://news.gmane.org/gmane.comp.version-control.git

 note: .onion URLs require Tor: https://www.torproject.org/

AGPL code for this site: git clone https://public-inbox.org/ public-inbox