git@vger.kernel.org mailing list mirror (one of many)
 help / color / mirror / code / Atom feed
From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: "René Scharfe" <l.s.r@web.de>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org, "Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason" <avarab@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PATCH 0/6] hash-object: use fsck to check objects
Date: Sun, 22 Jan 2023 02:48:52 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y8zqZH+X6fOoCOYV@coredump.intra.peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <97faa323-a5b9-e459-70d7-3f6318446898@web.de>

On Sat, Jan 21, 2023 at 10:36:08AM +0100, René Scharfe wrote:

> Am 19.01.23 um 02:39 schrieb Jeff King:
> >
> > Though I do find the use of strlen() in decode_tree_entry()
> > a little suspicious (and that would be true of the current code, as
> > well, since it powers hash-object's existing parsing check).
> 
> strlen() won't overrun the buffer because the first check in
> decode_tree_entry() makes sure there is a NUL in the buffer ahead.
> If get_mode() crosses it then we exit early.

Yeah, that was what I found after digging deeper (see my patch 7).

> Storing the result in an unsigned int can overflow on platforms where
> size_t is bigger.  That would result in pathlen values being too short
> for really long paths, but no out-of-bounds access.  They are then
> stored as signed int in struct name_entry and used as such in many
> places -- that seems like a bad idea, but I didn't actually check them
> thoroughly.

Yeah, I agree that the use of a signed int there looks questionable. I
do think it's orthogonal to my series here, as that tree-decoding is
used by the existing hash-object checks.

But it probably bears further examination, especially because we use it
for the fsck checks on incoming objects via receive-pack, etc, which are
meant to be the first line of defense for hosters who might receive
malicious garbage from users.

We probably ought to reject trees with enormous names via fsck anyway. I
actually have a patch to do that, but of course it depends on
decode_tree_entry() to get the length, so there's a bit of
chicken-and-egg. We probably also should outright reject gigantic trees,
which closes out a whole class of integer truncation problems. I know
GitHub has rejected trees over 100MB for years for this reason.

> get_mode() can overflow "mode" if there are too many octal digits.  Do
> we need to accept more than two handfuls in the first place?  I'll send
> a patch for at least rejecting overflow.

Seems reasonable. I doubt there's an interesting attack here, just
because the mode isn't used to index anything. If you feed a garbage
mode that happens to overflow to something useful, you could just as
easily have sent the useful mode in the first place.

> Hmm, what would be the performance impact of trees with mode fields
> zero-padded to silly lengths?

Certainly it would waste some time parsing the tree, but you could do
that already with a long pathname. Or just having a lot of paths in a
tree. Or a lot of trees.

-Peff

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-22  7:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-18 20:35 [RFC/PATCH 0/6] hash-object: use fsck to check objects Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:35 ` [PATCH 1/6] t1007: modernize malformed object tests Jeff King
2023-01-18 21:13   ` Taylor Blau
2023-01-18 20:35 ` [PATCH 2/6] t1006: stop using 0-padded timestamps Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:36 ` [PATCH 3/6] t7030: stop using invalid tag name Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:41 ` [PATCH 4/6] t: use hash-object --literally when created malformed objects Jeff King
2023-01-18 21:19   ` Taylor Blau
2023-01-19  2:06     ` Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:43 ` [PATCH 5/6] fsck: provide a function to fsck buffer without object struct Jeff King
2023-01-18 21:24   ` Taylor Blau
2023-01-19  2:07     ` Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:44 ` [PATCH 6/6] hash-object: use fsck for object checks Jeff King
2023-01-18 21:34   ` Taylor Blau
2023-01-19  2:31     ` Jeff King
2023-02-01 12:50   ` Jeff King
2023-02-01 13:08     ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2023-02-01 20:41     ` Junio C Hamano
2023-01-18 20:46 ` [RFC/PATCH 0/6] hash-object: use fsck to check objects Jeff King
2023-01-18 20:59 ` Junio C Hamano
2023-01-18 21:38   ` Taylor Blau
2023-01-19  2:03     ` Jeff King
2023-01-19  1:39 ` Jeff King
2023-01-19 23:13   ` [PATCH 7/6] fsck: do not assume NUL-termination of buffers Jeff King
2023-01-19 23:58     ` Junio C Hamano
2023-01-21  9:36   ` [RFC/PATCH 0/6] hash-object: use fsck to check objects René Scharfe
2023-01-22  7:48     ` Jeff King [this message]
2023-01-22 11:39       ` René Scharfe
2023-02-01 14:06         ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

  List information: http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=Y8zqZH+X6fOoCOYV@coredump.intra.peff.net \
    --to=peff@peff.net \
    --cc=avarab@gmail.com \
    --cc=git@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=l.s.r@web.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
Code repositories for project(s) associated with this public inbox

	https://80x24.org/mirrors/git.git

This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).