Re: [PATCH] gpg-interface: trim CR from ssh-keygen -Y find-principals

[Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>]

On Sat, 4 Dec 2021, Fabian Stelzer wrote:

> > I'm guessing probably not, but when it comes to something with security
> > implications like this, it pays to be extra careful. I'm hoping somebody
> > familiar with the ssh-keygen side and how the rest of the parsing works
> > (like Fabian) can verify that this is OK.
> > 
> 
> A good point. I just tested this and CR is a valid character to use in a
> principal name in the allowed signers file and as of now the principal will be
> passed to the verify call `as is` and everything works just fine. When we
> introduce the patch above a principal with a CR in it will fail to verify.

Are you sure? I thought that we split principals in allowed_signers on
most whitespace, including \r. Follow:

https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/e9c7149/sshsig.c#L742
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/e9c7149/misc.c#L452
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/e9c7149/misc.c#L408

> I've added Damien Miller to this thread. He knows more about what the expected
> behaviour for the principal would/should be. I think at the moment almost
> everything except \n or \0 goes. Maybe restricting \r as well would make life
> easier for other uses too?

IMO sensible content for the principals section would be printable, non-
whitespace characters, excluding wildcards ('*', '?'). ssh-keygen mostly
assumes that the file is in good order, but maybe it could be stricter.

> If we add `trust on first use` in a future series I would assume we use the
> email address from the commit/tag author ident when adding a new principal to
> the file. Can the ident contain a CR?
> Even if it did, I would only allow a list of allowed alphanumeric chars to be
> added anyway since a principal can contain wildcards which we obviously don't
> want to trust on first use ;).

Yeah. my mental model for the allowed_signers file is that it's similar
to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in that it directly controls authn/authz
decisions, and if you put bad stuff in there then you're going to have
a bad day...

-d