* [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic
@ 2019-06-04 17:57 Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Matthew DeVore @ 2019-06-04 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: git; +Cc: Matthew DeVore, sandals, jeffhostetler, l.s.r, gitster, spearce,
jrn
This roll-up includes simple but important fixes from Brian Carlson and René
Scharfe.
- fix typo of "NUL" in commit heading
- re-enable %-decoding in non-NULL-terminated strings
Matthew DeVore (2):
url: do not read past end of buffer
url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs
url.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer
2019-06-04 17:57 [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
@ 2019-06-04 17:57 ` Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 20:27 ` Junio C Hamano
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 21:13 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Matthew DeVore @ 2019-06-04 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: git; +Cc: Matthew DeVore, sandals, jeffhostetler, l.s.r, gitster, spearce,
jrn
url_decode_internal could have been tricked into reading past the length
of the **query buffer if there are fewer than 2 characters after a % (in
a null-terminated string, % would have to be the last character).
Prevent this from happening by checking len before decoding the %
sequence.
Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
---
url.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
index 25576c390b..9ea9d5611b 100644
--- a/url.c
+++ b/url.c
@@ -39,21 +39,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
unsigned char c = *q;
if (!c)
break;
if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
q++;
len--;
break;
}
- if (c == '%') {
+ if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
if (0 <= val) {
strbuf_addch(out, val);
q += 3;
len -= 3;
continue;
}
}
if (decode_plus && c == '+')
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs
2019-06-04 17:57 [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
@ 2019-06-04 17:57 ` Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 21:13 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Matthew DeVore @ 2019-06-04 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: git; +Cc: Matthew DeVore, sandals, jeffhostetler, l.s.r, gitster, spearce,
jrn
There is no reason to allow %00 to terminate a string, so do not allow it.
Otherwise, we end up returning arbitrary content in the string (that which is
after the %00) which is effectively hidden from callers and can escape sanity
checks and validation, and possible be used in tandem with a security
vulnerability to introduce a payload.
Helped-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
---
url.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
index 9ea9d5611b..1b8ef78cea 100644
--- a/url.c
+++ b/url.c
@@ -41,21 +41,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
if (!c)
break;
if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
q++;
len--;
break;
}
if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
- if (0 <= val) {
+ if (0 < val) {
strbuf_addch(out, val);
q += 3;
len -= 3;
continue;
}
}
if (decode_plus && c == '+')
strbuf_addch(out, ' ');
else
--
2.21.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
@ 2019-06-04 20:27 ` Junio C Hamano
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Junio C Hamano @ 2019-06-04 20:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew DeVore; +Cc: git, sandals, jeffhostetler, l.s.r, spearce, jrn
Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com> writes:
> url_decode_internal could have been tricked into reading past the length
> of the **query buffer if there are fewer than 2 characters after a % (in
> a null-terminated string, % would have to be the last character).
> Prevent this from happening by checking len before decoding the %
> sequence.
>
> Helped-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
> ---
> url.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/url.c b/url.c
> index 25576c390b..9ea9d5611b 100644
> --- a/url.c
> +++ b/url.c
> @@ -39,21 +39,21 @@ static char *url_decode_internal(const char **query, int len,
> unsigned char c = *q;
>
> if (!c)
> break;
> if (stop_at && strchr(stop_at, c)) {
> q++;
> len--;
> break;
> }
>
> - if (c == '%') {
> + if (c == '%' && (len < 0 || len >= 3)) {
> int val = hex2chr(q + 1);
This made me wonder what happens when the caller sent -1 in len, but
hex2chr() stops on such a string with % plus one hexadecimal at the
end of the string, and we'd end up copying these two bytes one at a
time, which is what we want, so it is OK. And the rejection of %00
done in 2/2 follows the same codeflow here, which is quite straight
forward.
Nice.
> if (0 <= val) {
> strbuf_addch(out, val);
> q += 3;
> len -= 3;
> continue;
> }
> }
>
> if (decode_plus && c == '+')
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic
2019-06-04 17:57 [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs Matthew DeVore
@ 2019-06-04 21:13 ` Matthew DeVore
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Matthew DeVore @ 2019-06-04 21:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthew DeVore; +Cc: git, sandals, jeffhost, l.s.r, gitster, spearce, jrn
First message had incorrect recipient list. Re-sending with non-typo'd Jeff's
e-mail address.
Someone also politely reminded me off-band that I should make subsequent
versions of patchsets be respond-to on the cover-letter of v1 of that patchset.
I will do that from next time.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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2019-06-04 17:57 [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] url: do not read past end of buffer Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 20:27 ` Junio C Hamano
2019-06-04 17:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] url: do not allow %00 to represent NUL in URLs Matthew DeVore
2019-06-04 21:13 ` [PATCH v2 0/2] Harden url.c URL-decoding logic Matthew DeVore
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