On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 02:44:31PM +0100, Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 04 2018, brian m. carlson wrote:
> > First, I'd like to see a section (and a bit in the implementation)
> > requiring HTTPS if the original protocol is secure (SSH or HTTPS).
> > Allowing the server to downgrade to HTTP, even by accident, would be a
> > security problem.
> 
> Maybe I've misunderstood the design (I'm writing some other follow-up
> E-Mails in this thread which might clarify things for me), but I don't
> see why.
> 
> We get the ref advertisement from the server. We don't need to trust the
> CDN server or the transport layer. We just download whatever we get from
> there, validate the packfile with SHA-1 (and in the future SHA-256). It
> doesn't matter if the CDN transport is insecure.
> 
> You can do this offline with git today, you don't need to trust me to
> trust that my copy of git.git I give you on a sketchy USB stick is
> genuine. Just unpack it, then compare the SHA-1s you get with:
> 
>     git ls-remote https://github.com/git/git.git
> 
> So this is a case similar to Debian's where they distribute packages
> over http, but manifests over https: https://whydoesaptnotusehttps.com

This assumes that integrity of the data is the only reason you'd want to
use HTTPS. There's also confidentiality. Perhaps a user is downloading
data that will help them circumvent the Great Firewall of China. A
downgrade to HTTP could result in a long prison sentence.

Furthermore, some ISPs tamper with headers to allow tracking, and some
environments (e.g. schools and libraries) perform opportunistic
filtering on HTTP connections to filter certain content (and a lot of
this filtering is really simplistic).

Moreover, Google is planning on using this and filters in place of Git
LFS for large objects. I expect that if this approach becomes viable, it
may actually grow authentication functionality, or, depending on how the
series uses the existing code, it may already have it. In such a case,
we should not allow authentication to go over a plaintext connection
when the user thinks that the connection they're using is encrypted
(since they used an SSH or HTTPS URL to clone or fetch).

Downgrades from HTTPS to HTTP are generally considered CVE-worthy. We
need to make sure that we refuse to allow a downgrade on the client
side, even if the server ignores our request for a secure protocol.

> > Second, this feature likely should be opt-in for SSH. One issue I've
> > seen repeatedly is that people don't want to use HTTPS to fetch things
> > when they're using SSH for Git. Many people in corporate environments
> > have proxies that break HTTP for non-browser use cases[0], and using SSH
> > is the only way that they can make a functional Git connection.
> 
> Yeah, there should definitely be accommodations for such clients, per my
> reading clients can always ignore the CDN and proceed with a normal
> negotiation. Isn't that enough, or is something extra needed?

I think at least a config option and a command line flag are needed to
be able to turn CDN usage off. There needs to be an easy way for people
in broken environments to circumvent the breakage.
-- 
brian m. carlson: Houston, Texas, US
OpenPGP: https://keybase.io/bk2204